Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility.
Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality / A. Guardo. - In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0967-2559. - 27:4(2019), pp. 515-527. [10.1080/09672559.2019.1632369]
Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality
A. Guardo
Primo
2019
Abstract
Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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