Limitations on the independence of constitutional courts are among the main pointers of constitutional regression. Taking a cue from the best-known cases in Europe and Latin America (Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela) the paper considers how the ‘normalization’ or ‘neutralization’ of the courts has triggered and then maintained illiberal degeneration (since these institutions are the major counter-balance to the political majority). The paper explores the role played by the ‘reformed’ courts in the new political reality, and also takes into account the dialogue with international courts. The latter aspect is very sensitive, considering the tough implementation of the judgements of supranational courts in cases of constitutional ‘sovereignism’. The analysis will be performed using the method of comparative law.
Constitutional Courts in the Context of Constitutional Regression : Some Comparative Remarks / A. DI GREGORIO. ((Intervento presentato al 3. convegno ‘Erasmus’ Legal Science Week University of Sofia tenutosi a Sofia nel 2019.
Titolo: | Constitutional Courts in the Context of Constitutional Regression : Some Comparative Remarks |
Autori: | DI GREGORIO, ANGELA (Corresponding) |
Data di pubblicazione: | 29-mar-2019 |
Parole Chiave: | constitutional courts; constitutional regressions; authoritarian regimes; European conditionality |
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: | Settore IUS/21 - Diritto Pubblico Comparato |
Enti collegati al convegno: | University of Sofia Kliment Ohridski |
Tipologia: | Conference Object |
Citazione: | Constitutional Courts in the Context of Constitutional Regression : Some Comparative Remarks / A. DI GREGORIO. ((Intervento presentato al 3. convegno ‘Erasmus’ Legal Science Week University of Sofia tenutosi a Sofia nel 2019. |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 14 - Intervento a convegno non pubblicato |
File in questo prodotto:
File | Descrizione | Tipologia | Licenza | |
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DIGREGORIOdef..pdf | Pre-print (manoscritto inviato all'editore) | Open Access Visualizza/Apri |