The use of plenary time during legislative debates has consequences for the enhancement of party goals. Hence, parties have different preferences on how legislative time should be managed: while some parties would like time not to be ‘wasted’ on the floor, other parties may instead try to ‘consume’ as much time as possible. Speeches delivered in the plenary signal these preferences. Focusing on plenary debates on legislation, this paper proposes a theory for explaining party speech-making behaviour that takes into consideration parties’ preferences on the use of time and their incentives related to the divide between government and opposition. The theoretical argument also emphasises the role of issue salience and party cohesion, which interact with the incentives faced by government and opposition parties. Hypotheses are tested against data from over 21,000 speeches delivered in the Italian parliament. Results highlight the importance of considering the different incentives faced by government and opposition parties when analysing speech making in parliamentary settings, and suggest some interesting avenues for future enquiry.

Wasting or Saving Time? How Government and Opposition Parties Use Time during Legislative Debates : Evidence from the Italian Case / A. Pedrazzani. - In: THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES. - ISSN 1357-2334. - 23:3(2017), pp. 439-464. [10.1080/13572334.2017.1361206]

Wasting or Saving Time? How Government and Opposition Parties Use Time during Legislative Debates : Evidence from the Italian Case

A. Pedrazzani
2017

Abstract

The use of plenary time during legislative debates has consequences for the enhancement of party goals. Hence, parties have different preferences on how legislative time should be managed: while some parties would like time not to be ‘wasted’ on the floor, other parties may instead try to ‘consume’ as much time as possible. Speeches delivered in the plenary signal these preferences. Focusing on plenary debates on legislation, this paper proposes a theory for explaining party speech-making behaviour that takes into consideration parties’ preferences on the use of time and their incentives related to the divide between government and opposition. The theoretical argument also emphasises the role of issue salience and party cohesion, which interact with the incentives faced by government and opposition parties. Hypotheses are tested against data from over 21,000 speeches delivered in the Italian parliament. Results highlight the importance of considering the different incentives faced by government and opposition parties when analysing speech making in parliamentary settings, and suggest some interesting avenues for future enquiry.
plenary debates; legislative speeches; time; government–opposition; parliamentary parties; Italian politics
Settore SPS/11 - Sociologia dei Fenomeni Politici
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/628093
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