This thesis analyses the evolution of proairesis and self-determination in Neoplatonism, with particular attention to the evolution of the concept in Plotinus and Proclus. The first part of the thesis functions as an introduction and it briefly highlights the aspects of the previous theorizations (from Plato and Aristotle to Hellenistic philosophies) on proairesis which later fell back into Neoplatonism. I will focus on the role of the soul, on the possibilities and limitations of man’s self-determination, on the evolution of proairesis by "deliberate choice between means to achieve an end" to "choice between two moral options connoted as good and evil". The second part of the thesis concerns the Neoplatonist self-deliberation and proairesis. As it is well known, Neoplatonists try to combine a system ruled by providence and fate with the existence of human self-determination. Here, I show that Plotinus and Proclus have different elaboration of self-determination. It seems to be depended on a different interpretation of the nature of the Platonic soul. Plotinus' conception is based on a dualistic idea of soul. His elaboration of soul also lacks of any intermediate condition characterized by the cognitive doubt and by a relationship on equal terms between rational and irrational part. In this case, conceiving the choice intended as a deliberate choice between good and evil is more difficult. Therefore, self-determination will be only a rational choice of the good. On the contrary, Proclus elaborates a non-dualistic conception of soul. He foresees the possibility of intermediate conditions and cognitive doubts. It follows that he recovers the concept of proairesis, in the version elaborated in the Hellenistic. He uses it to indicate one of the two forms of self-determination conceived by him, that is self-determination as a process of choice between two morally connoted options. For this reason, Proclus' proairesis is the central point of man's self-determination and of man's moral responsibility in his ethical process of coming back to god. It is also what characterizes man as a being with an intermediate nature inside the Universe, distinguishing him both from animals and intelligible principles.

LA PROAIRESIS IN PLOTINO E PROCLO: UNA PROPOSTA INTERPRETATIVA SULLA SCELTA MORALE NEL NEOPLATONISMO / R. Bonanno ; Tutor: M. BONAZZI, G. MORMINO, J. OPSOMER. - : . Università degli Studi di Milano, 2019 Feb 06. ((31. ciclo, Anno Accademico 2018. [10.13130/bonanno-roberta_phd2019-02-06].

LA PROAIRESIS IN PLOTINO E PROCLO: UNA PROPOSTA INTERPRETATIVA SULLA SCELTA MORALE NEL NEOPLATONISMO

BONANNO, ROBERTA
2019-02-06

Abstract

This thesis analyses the evolution of proairesis and self-determination in Neoplatonism, with particular attention to the evolution of the concept in Plotinus and Proclus. The first part of the thesis functions as an introduction and it briefly highlights the aspects of the previous theorizations (from Plato and Aristotle to Hellenistic philosophies) on proairesis which later fell back into Neoplatonism. I will focus on the role of the soul, on the possibilities and limitations of man’s self-determination, on the evolution of proairesis by "deliberate choice between means to achieve an end" to "choice between two moral options connoted as good and evil". The second part of the thesis concerns the Neoplatonist self-deliberation and proairesis. As it is well known, Neoplatonists try to combine a system ruled by providence and fate with the existence of human self-determination. Here, I show that Plotinus and Proclus have different elaboration of self-determination. It seems to be depended on a different interpretation of the nature of the Platonic soul. Plotinus' conception is based on a dualistic idea of soul. His elaboration of soul also lacks of any intermediate condition characterized by the cognitive doubt and by a relationship on equal terms between rational and irrational part. In this case, conceiving the choice intended as a deliberate choice between good and evil is more difficult. Therefore, self-determination will be only a rational choice of the good. On the contrary, Proclus elaborates a non-dualistic conception of soul. He foresees the possibility of intermediate conditions and cognitive doubts. It follows that he recovers the concept of proairesis, in the version elaborated in the Hellenistic. He uses it to indicate one of the two forms of self-determination conceived by him, that is self-determination as a process of choice between two morally connoted options. For this reason, Proclus' proairesis is the central point of man's self-determination and of man's moral responsibility in his ethical process of coming back to god. It is also what characterizes man as a being with an intermediate nature inside the Universe, distinguishing him both from animals and intelligible principles.
MORMINO, GIANFRANCO
Neoplatonismo; proairesis; autodeterminazione; anima; Plotino; Proclo; responsabilità morale;
Settore M-FIL/07 - Storia della Filosofia Antica
LA PROAIRESIS IN PLOTINO E PROCLO: UNA PROPOSTA INTERPRETATIVA SULLA SCELTA MORALE NEL NEOPLATONISMO / R. Bonanno ; Tutor: M. BONAZZI, G. MORMINO, J. OPSOMER. - : . Università degli Studi di Milano, 2019 Feb 06. ((31. ciclo, Anno Accademico 2018. [10.13130/bonanno-roberta_phd2019-02-06].
Doctoral Thesis
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/627570
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