Developing a corporate code of ethics amounts to something like playing the role of a ‘constitution designer’ on a small scale. It is an experiment of rational decision about the general and abstract norms that have towork as constitutional constraints on a ‘corporate actor’ – that is, a firm seen as amicro-constitutional order (Coleman 1990; Vanberg 1992). Codes of ethics in fact regulate claims and rights that several stakeholders may advance towards the organization, so that, when these claims are legitimate by the institution of a code of ethics, those who govern the firm must respond and to be accountable for them.

Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: a game theoretic model under fuzzy information / L. Sacconi (ROUTLEDGE SIENA STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY). - In: Legal orderings and economic institutions / [a cura di] F. Cafaggi, A. Nicita, U. Pagano. - Prima edizione. - London : Routledge, 2007. - ISBN 9780203391327. - pp. 310-350

Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: a game theoretic model under fuzzy information

L. Sacconi
2007

Abstract

Developing a corporate code of ethics amounts to something like playing the role of a ‘constitution designer’ on a small scale. It is an experiment of rational decision about the general and abstract norms that have towork as constitutional constraints on a ‘corporate actor’ – that is, a firm seen as amicro-constitutional order (Coleman 1990; Vanberg 1992). Codes of ethics in fact regulate claims and rights that several stakeholders may advance towards the organization, so that, when these claims are legitimate by the institution of a code of ethics, those who govern the firm must respond and to be accountable for them.
Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica
Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia del Diritto
2007
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/598200
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