The social contract approach to the study if institutions aims at providing a solution to the problem of compliance with rational agreements in situations characterized by a conflict between individual rationality and social optimality. After a short discussion of some attempts to deal with this problem from a rational choice perspective, we focus on John Rawls's idea of 'sense of justice' and its application to the explanation of the stability of a well-ordered society. We show how the relevant features of Rawls's theory can be captured by a behavioral game theory model of beliefs-dependent dispositions to comply, and we present the results of two experimental studies that provide support to the theory.
Contractarian Compliance and the 'Sense of Justice': A Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support / L. Sacconi, M. Faillo, S. Ottone. - In: ANALYSE & KRITIK. - ISSN 0171-5860. - 2011:1(2011), pp. 273-310. [10.1515/auk-2011-0120]
Contractarian Compliance and the 'Sense of Justice': A Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support
L. Sacconi;
2011
Abstract
The social contract approach to the study if institutions aims at providing a solution to the problem of compliance with rational agreements in situations characterized by a conflict between individual rationality and social optimality. After a short discussion of some attempts to deal with this problem from a rational choice perspective, we focus on John Rawls's idea of 'sense of justice' and its application to the explanation of the stability of a well-ordered society. We show how the relevant features of Rawls's theory can be captured by a behavioral game theory model of beliefs-dependent dispositions to comply, and we present the results of two experimental studies that provide support to the theory.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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