Using an OLG model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we investigate whether an optimally designed set of public pension transfers can usefully supplement a nonlinear labor income tax as a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. We consider a Mirrleesian setting where agents' skills are private information and highlight that, even though pensions, by crowding out private savings, adversely affect the achievement of the golden-rule, they can be used as a mimicking-deterring device that makes it easier for the government to achieve the desired redistributive goals.
Public pensions in a multiperiod Mirrleesian income tax model / S. Bastani, S. Blomquist, L. Micheletto (CESIFO SEMINAR SERIES). - In: The Taxation of Pensions / [a cura di] R. Holzmann, J. Piggott. - Prima edizione. - [s.l] : MIT Press, 2018 Aug 07. - ISBN 9780262038324. - pp. 51-79
Public pensions in a multiperiod Mirrleesian income tax model
L. Micheletto
2018
Abstract
Using an OLG model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we investigate whether an optimally designed set of public pension transfers can usefully supplement a nonlinear labor income tax as a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. We consider a Mirrleesian setting where agents' skills are private information and highlight that, even though pensions, by crowding out private savings, adversely affect the achievement of the golden-rule, they can be used as a mimicking-deterring device that makes it easier for the government to achieve the desired redistributive goals.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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PensionsandAge1700120 (2).pdf
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