Using an OLG model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we investigate whether an optimally designed set of public pension transfers can usefully supplement a nonlinear labor income tax as a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. We consider a Mirrleesian setting where agents' skills are private information and highlight that, even though pensions, by crowding out private savings, adversely affect the achievement of the golden-rule, they can be used as a mimicking-deterring device that makes it easier for the government to achieve the desired redistributive goals.
|Titolo:||Public pensions in a multiperiod Mirrleesian income tax model|
|Parole Chiave:||Public pensions; dynamic optimal income taxation; capital income taxation; tagging|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica|
Settore SECS-P/03 - Scienza delle Finanze
|Data di pubblicazione:||7-ago-2018|
|Tipologia:||Book Part (author)|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||03 - Contributo in volume|