An objection put forward by, among others, John McDowell to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s relativist view of semantic discourse goes roughly as follows: relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. I show that even though relativism about semantic discourse does entail a form of global relativism, the relativism in question does not entail anything like subjective idealism. This particular kind of relativism holds that which character, in Kaplan’s sense, is associated to a given utterance depends on what MacFarlane calls “the context of assessment”.
|Titolo:||Meaning relativism and subjective idealism|
|Parole Chiave:||Meaning relativism; Subjective idealism; Assessment sensitivity; Kripkenstein; Kripke|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Data ahead of print / Data di stampa:||2018|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1007/s11229-018-01917-9|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|