The Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of the European Union (EU) countries policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of coordination, explicitly modelling the democratic process through which policy is determined. In a symmetric, two-country citizen-candidate setup, in which accepting asylum seekers in one country generates a cross-border externality in the other, we show that coordination is desirable. Internalizing the externality leads to a welfare improvement over the non-cooperative outcome. However, contrary to suggestions by many observers, we show that allowing for cross-country transfers in the cooperative outcome leads to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effects
Asylum seekers in Europe : the warm glow of a hot potato / G. Facchini, O. Lorz and G. Willmann. - In: JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0933-1433. - 19:2(2006 Jun), pp. 411-430.
Asylum seekers in Europe : the warm glow of a hot potato
G. FacchiniPrimo
;
2006
Abstract
The Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of the European Union (EU) countries policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of coordination, explicitly modelling the democratic process through which policy is determined. In a symmetric, two-country citizen-candidate setup, in which accepting asylum seekers in one country generates a cross-border externality in the other, we show that coordination is desirable. Internalizing the externality leads to a welfare improvement over the non-cooperative outcome. However, contrary to suggestions by many observers, we show that allowing for cross-country transfers in the cooperative outcome leads to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effectsPubblicazioni consigliate
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