A large amount of evidence indicates that group identity influences social interactions and, in particular, economic decisions. In this article, we test the hypothesis that group identity triggers social norms or heuristics, using reaction times collected in a series of simple distributive tasks (minidictator games). We control for individual preferences using the degree of selfishness expressed in the allocation decisions, and we account for variations in the difficulty of making decisions based on subjects’ prosocial inclination. Our results support the heuristic hypothesis: Generosity seems to be an effect of “fast and frugal” behavioral rules that simplify decisions, especially when it conflicts with an underlying tendency to behave in a self-interested manner. In the language of “dualprocess” theories, group identity triggers System 1 processes that facilitate choice and override slow, calculative decision-making.
|Titolo:||Group Identity as a Social Heuristic: An Experiment with Reaction Times|
|Parole Chiave:||group identity; reaction time; heuristics; social preferences|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica|
Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica
|Data di pubblicazione:||2017|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1037/npe0000078|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|