La ricerca di un senso nella vita, la prospettiva morale e i limiti di una concezione sentimentalista

I discuss Eugenio Lecaldano’s view of the search for meaning in life focusing on three issues. First, I suggest that an accurate account should accommodate both a prospective and a retrospective mode of the reflection on meaning in one’s own life. Second, Lecaldano’s distinction between meaningfulness and morality is underdetermined in two respects: (a) because a more flexible view of morality is able to integrate a consideration of meaningfulness in terms of the agent’s own perfection, avoiding moralistic implications, and (b) because a genuine separation between meaningfulness and morality seems to make sense only from a third-person standpoint. Third, I argue that Lecaldano’s sentimentalist view is not supported by conclusive arguments and cannot account for the possibility of a meaningful life without feelings of accomplishment and affirmation.