In this paper, we investigate whether managerial power and experience of executives influence M&A performance and whether there is a link between M&A performance and executive compensation. The aim is to understand if any causality relationship exists among executives power, bank performance and their compensation in Europe. To assess banking performance and CEO compensation we use OLS regression model on 52 bank–to-bank M&A from EU15 countries plus Norway and Iceland. We find a positive significant relationship between managerial power and post deal bank performance.
Banking Mergers and Acquisitions’ Performance and Executive Compensation in Europe / F. Arnaboldi, A. Rym - In: Markets and Compensation for Executives in Europe / [a cura di] L. Oxelheim, C. Wilborg. - Bingley : Emerald, 2008. - ISBN 9780080557380. - pp. 97-126
Banking Mergers and Acquisitions’ Performance and Executive Compensation in Europe
F. ArnaboldiPrimo
;
2008
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether managerial power and experience of executives influence M&A performance and whether there is a link between M&A performance and executive compensation. The aim is to understand if any causality relationship exists among executives power, bank performance and their compensation in Europe. To assess banking performance and CEO compensation we use OLS regression model on 52 bank–to-bank M&A from EU15 countries plus Norway and Iceland. We find a positive significant relationship between managerial power and post deal bank performance.
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