The Author focuses on the theory according to which the President of the Republic, after the electoral reform approved in 1993, is obliged to dissolve Parliament before the end of its term if the Government loses the support of the coalition that won the elections. The Author argues that automatic dissolution of Parliament is incompatible with the parliamentary form of government unless political parties adopt it as a rule of conduct. To confirm her argument, the Author analyses the Scalfaro, Ciampi and Napolitano presidencies underlining that all three Heads of State dissolved Parliament only after they had verified that it was impossible to form a new Government. In conclusion, the Author criticises the theory according to which the President of the Republic should dissolve Parliament when he believes there is a discrepancy between the will of the people and the will of Parliament. She argues that the President of the Republic should never exercise the power of dissolution for this reason.
|Titolo:||Sugli automatismi in tema di scioglimento anticipato delle Camere|
|Parole Chiave:||Scioglimento anticipato; Presidente della Repubblica|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore IUS/08 - Diritto Costituzionale|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2008|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1439/27314|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|