This paper aims to show how a consequentialist ethical theory can account for the function and utility of the concept of legal rights. It proposes that the so-called "Interest Theory" of rights, which treats rights as benefits for their holders, should be preferred to the so-called "Will Theory", on account of its better explanation of the specific function of rights. A consequentialist perspective, it is further proposed, can also explain away or amend some alleged or real defects of the Interest Theory, which are due to the influence of "right-based" ethical theories.
Funzioni e definizioni di "diritto soggettivo" : una prospettiva consequenzialista / F. Ferraro. - In: RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO. - ISSN 2280-482X. - 2:2(2013), pp. 401-422. [10.4477/75222]
Funzioni e definizioni di "diritto soggettivo" : una prospettiva consequenzialista
F. FerraroPrimo
2013
Abstract
This paper aims to show how a consequentialist ethical theory can account for the function and utility of the concept of legal rights. It proposes that the so-called "Interest Theory" of rights, which treats rights as benefits for their holders, should be preferred to the so-called "Will Theory", on account of its better explanation of the specific function of rights. A consequentialist perspective, it is further proposed, can also explain away or amend some alleged or real defects of the Interest Theory, which are due to the influence of "right-based" ethical theories.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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