Psycho-Sociology of Fundamental Rights: Two Petrażyckian Perspectives (Articolo in russo con abstract, titolo e parole-chiave in inglese)

FITTIPALDI E. PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO NEOPETRAŻYCKIAN PERSPECTIVES In this article the author tries to put the psycho-social phenomenon of human rights (or fundamental rights) into a strict Petrażyckian framework. Since the naïve concept of human rights is an incoherent and practical one, the author proposes two possible non-exhaustive stipulative definitions aimed at selecting sets of phenomena somewhat intersecting with the set of phenomena designated by the term “human rights” in different languages. Both definitions are inspired by the main tenets of Petrażyckianism, but the second one is also based on the ideas of the Italian scholar G. Palombella, as well as on certain ideas developed by A. G. Conte and his school. The first definition re-defines human rights as humane rights, namely imperative-attributive convictions (and relevant “projections”) caused by the emergence or spreading of affiliative emotions in a certain society. The second definition re-defines human rights as substantive convictions of the Subject concerning the conditions of a binding character of a normative fact (human rights as a subclass of substantive anankastic normative-factual convictions). In this connection the role of intuitive law is discussed. This second definition also covers substantive convictions concerning the conditions at which a certain Constitutional Court or the identical body is experienced as authorized to enact a norm-annihilating normative fact directed at the removal of legal convictions brought about by another normative fact (human rights as a subclass of substantive paraanankastic normative-factual convictions). KEYWORDS: human rights, Leon Petrażycki, affiliative emotions, anankasticconstitutive convictions, Gianluigi Palombella, Amedeo G. Conte, intuitive law.