What Concept of Morality for Sociology of Morality? From Ossowska's Rejection of Substantive Definitions to a Formal (Psychoanalytic) Cross-Disciplinary One

Ossowska contended that it is impossible to give a coherent definition of morality but at the same time she refused to adopt a stipulative definition for it. In § 1 the author illustrates Ossowska's official attitude towards stipulative definitions. In § 2 he shows that Ossowska was not always consistent with her programme of abstaining from using stipulative definitions. In § 3 the author asks whether Ossowska's rejection of stipulative definitions of morality can be somewhat compared with Bourdieu's concept of illusio. In § 4 the author con- tends that Ossowska's failure in finding satisfactory descriptive definitions for morality is to be explained by her searching exclusively for substantive defini- tions. The author argues, instead, that a formal definition for morality can be given. Such a proposal was first made by the Polish scientist of law and moral- ity, Leon Petra¿ycki, who provided a purely formal definition for both, and his definition is compatible with the findings of psychoanalysis in this regard. Thus Fittipaldi proposes a Freudian-Petra¿yckian stipulative definition of a moral evaluation as an evaluation backed by a superegoic emotion. Superegoic emo- tions may be addressed to virtually whatever object (hence the formal nature of the definition) and all of them stem from the archaic helplessness of the child via-à-vis his caregivers, caregivers whom the child at once loves, fears and admires. According to the author, this definition is heuristically fruitful and makes it possible to cover all the areas that according to Ossowska should be investigated by her science or sociology of morality. Keywords: Maria Ossowska, Pierre Bourdieu, Leon Petrazycki, Psychoanalysis