Deliberation without sincerity

Sincerity is considered a key notion within theories of deliberative democracy and a crucial feature of public reason approaches that give deliberation a prominent role. However, few theorists have put forward a clear and definite account for it. Two interesting and recent attempts to provide a distinct argument for sincerity in deliberation are Schwartzman’s Principle of sincerity in public justification and Gaus’s defence of convergence in public reason as a way to ensure sincerity in public discourse. Here, I question and reject both accounts. First, I tackle Schwartzman’s proposal and argue that both his conceptual and his instrumental arguments fail because his principle is in tension with the idea of the wide view of public reason he defends and with the epistemological virtues he associates with deliberation. Secondly, I turn to Gaus and argue that convergence is incompatible with sincere deliberation because, although some sort of philosophical relativism about reasons might support it, it is nevertheless over-demanding and unrealistic in the actual context of deliberation. I then propose a principle of reliability in deliberation apt secure the possibility of deliberation and shelter mutual trust by excluding the possibility of tricking others without relying on the controversial notion of sincerity.