In this paper, I am interested in providing some defense of what has been called “The objective Reason View”, namely the idea that justificatory reasons are agreement-independent (and, in turn, agreements do not affect the normative justification of political authority) for they are considerations given by or stemming from objective facts. To do so, I build on Fabienne Peter’s paper “From Objective Reason to Public Reason”. I challenge some of her arguments and attempt to highlight some problems of the public reason view (without neglecting those affecting my preferred view, namely the objective reason one). Indeed, my aim is to propose a comparison between the two views in order to analyse and evaluate them. Philosophy is not an “all win” game, all perspectives have their problems and the point is to understand which are those we care the most about. I want to argue that the objective reason view score more plausibility points than the public reason view, all things considered.
The objective reason view defended / G. Bistagnino. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Summer school equality and citizenship tenutosi a Rijeka nel 2016.
|Titolo:||The objective reason view defended|
BISTAGNINO, GIULIA (Primo)
|Data di pubblicazione:||8-giu-2016|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SPS/01 - Filosofia Politica|
|Citazione:||The objective reason view defended / G. Bistagnino. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Summer school equality and citizenship tenutosi a Rijeka nel 2016.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||14 - Intervento a convegno non pubblicato|