The last several decades have witnessed a vibrant discussion about the proper political role of religion in pluralistic liberal democracies. An important part of that discussion has been a dispute about the role that religious and secular reasons properly play in the justification of state coercion. As I understand it, the standard view advocated by the members of that pantheon, and by many others as well, includes the following two claims, namely, that religious reasons cannot play a decisive role in justifying state coercion and that citizens and public officials in a liberal polity should not endorse state coercion that requires decisive religious support. I am skeptical about the standard view’s restrictions on religious reasons as a class – restrictions that apply to any and all religious considerations, to religious reasons as such. My main aim in this paper is to motivate skepticism regarding the standard view. I will try to achieve this aim by reflecting on what I take to be the paradigmatic case of state coercion, namely, the use of military violence in war.
Religione, rispetto e guerra: contro la visione canonica della religione in politicaIn: ETICA & POLITICA. - ISSN 1825-5167. - 18:1(2016 May 09), pp. 11-33.Religione, rispetto e guerra: contro la visione canonica della religione in politicaIn: ETICA & POLITICA. - ISSN 1825-5167. - 18:1(2016 May 09), pp. 11-33..
Religione, rispetto e guerra: contro la visione canonica della religione in politica
G. BistagninoPrimo
2016
Abstract
The last several decades have witnessed a vibrant discussion about the proper political role of religion in pluralistic liberal democracies. An important part of that discussion has been a dispute about the role that religious and secular reasons properly play in the justification of state coercion. As I understand it, the standard view advocated by the members of that pantheon, and by many others as well, includes the following two claims, namely, that religious reasons cannot play a decisive role in justifying state coercion and that citizens and public officials in a liberal polity should not endorse state coercion that requires decisive religious support. I am skeptical about the standard view’s restrictions on religious reasons as a class – restrictions that apply to any and all religious considerations, to religious reasons as such. My main aim in this paper is to motivate skepticism regarding the standard view. I will try to achieve this aim by reflecting on what I take to be the paradigmatic case of state coercion, namely, the use of military violence in war.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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