The aim of this paper is to criticize some of the ambitions of the evolutionary explanations concerning the nature of first-person experiences (meanings, values), and to do so in the light of the notion of ‘emergent property’. The standard of such evolutionary explanatory models is set by the so-called adaptationist approach in biology, whose corollaries are to be found in contemporary research programs like sociobiology and evolutionary ethics. After making explicit the scope and reach of such an explanatory approach, we take into account S. J. Gould well-known criticism of adaptationism. Gould’s criticism turns out to be sound, but not radical enough. Therefore our argument takes a different route, by introducing the notion of ‘emergent property’, whose solidity we argue for through a criticism of two auxiliary principles of reductionism: the principle of causal inheritance, and the principle of the causal closure of the physical world. These steps allow us to justify a general ontological thesis, which states the necessity to grant ontological reality to irreducible qualities endowed with causal powers (i.e. emergent properties). The cognitive function of emergent properties, and the explanatory limits that they impose, make us conclude that evolutionary explanations are never in a position to meaningfully explain content, possibilities and meaning of first-person experiences.

Il significato delle proprietà emergenti per la teoria dell’evoluzione / A. Zhok. - In: PHILOSOPHICAL NEWS. - ISSN 2039-7194. - 11:2(2015 Dec), pp. 153-165.

Il significato delle proprietà emergenti per la teoria dell’evoluzione

A. Zhok
Primo
2015

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to criticize some of the ambitions of the evolutionary explanations concerning the nature of first-person experiences (meanings, values), and to do so in the light of the notion of ‘emergent property’. The standard of such evolutionary explanatory models is set by the so-called adaptationist approach in biology, whose corollaries are to be found in contemporary research programs like sociobiology and evolutionary ethics. After making explicit the scope and reach of such an explanatory approach, we take into account S. J. Gould well-known criticism of adaptationism. Gould’s criticism turns out to be sound, but not radical enough. Therefore our argument takes a different route, by introducing the notion of ‘emergent property’, whose solidity we argue for through a criticism of two auxiliary principles of reductionism: the principle of causal inheritance, and the principle of the causal closure of the physical world. These steps allow us to justify a general ontological thesis, which states the necessity to grant ontological reality to irreducible qualities endowed with causal powers (i.e. emergent properties). The cognitive function of emergent properties, and the explanatory limits that they impose, make us conclude that evolutionary explanations are never in a position to meaningfully explain content, possibilities and meaning of first-person experiences.
Evolutionary Biology, Ontology, Phenomenology, Evolution, Emergentism
Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica
Settore M-FIL/03 - Filosofia Morale
dic-2015
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/473591
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