Even hard-core metaphysicians should admit that certain disputes may indeed turn out not to be substantive. The debate between presentism and eternalism has recently come under sceptical attack. The aim of the paper is to argue that a certain approach to presentism is indeed in danger of succumbing to the sceptic, and thus a no-go for the presentist.

Presentism and the Sceptical Challenge / G. Torrengo. - In: MANUSCRITO. - ISSN 0100-6045. - 39:4(2016 Dec), pp. 101-116. [10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N4.GT]

Presentism and the Sceptical Challenge

G. Torrengo
Primo
2016

Abstract

Even hard-core metaphysicians should admit that certain disputes may indeed turn out not to be substantive. The debate between presentism and eternalism has recently come under sceptical attack. The aim of the paper is to argue that a certain approach to presentism is indeed in danger of succumbing to the sceptic, and thus a no-go for the presentist.
Presentism; Time; Scepticism
Settore M-FIL/05 - Filosofia e Teoria dei Linguaggi
Settore M-FIL/02 - Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
dic-2016
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/473582
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