Recent contributions in philosophy have shown that political realism, although refusing the elaboration of external moral standards on which to base legitimacy, does not renounce to a normative dimension. The version of political realism used in those reconstructions does not often stress the beliefs-based character of legitimacy, especially in the version elaborated by Max Weber. On the other hand, accounts of legitimacy based on beliefs do not explain what it means to have a belief in legitimacy. The aim of this paper is to show that a conception of legitimacy strictly dependent on individuals’ beliefs still presents a deep normative character, as the assessment of legitimacy depends on values embedded in individuals’ conceptions of life. To show this, I will need to provide an account of the characteristic beliefs and preferences (and their relation to truth) involved in the process of assessing legitimacy. In the first part I will provide an account of a realist approach to legitimacy based on people’s beliefs, showing some aspects shared by Max Weber and Bernard Williams. I will then show that neither Weber nor Williams explain what it means to have a belief in legitimacy. Particularly in Weber’s account, it seems that an individual conferring legitimacy on a non-rational basis stays silent in front of the question “why do you think the regime is legitimate?”. I will then suggest that having a belief in legitimacy means that the individual believes to have good reasons to support the regime legitimacy, even when the individual is eventually proved, by an external observer, to be wrong in her beliefs. In particular, to believe that a regime is legitimate means to believe that: 1. The regime has a value x; 2. Value x is positive/valuable per se; 3. Therefore, the regime is legitimate. The peculiarity of this view is that values are not necessarily intended in a moral way, but, neutrally, as something valuable; therefore, the challenge is to show that even the most instrumental account of legitimacy presents a value-dimension. Indeed, even a conception of legitimacy based on the mere provision of security (intended as the value x mentioned above) needs to refer to some principles and values in order to assess what security is: whether the prevention of people harming each other’s physical integrity, or the provision of a minimum quantity of goods to guarantee physical survival, or the protection of the individual intended as a person and not just as a body (including her ideas, desires, projects). To speak neutrally of positive qualities and to include all the types of values in the process of assessing legitimacy presents some advantages, as it allows to apply this concept of legitimacy to all the kinds of regimes – a concept that includes context-based conceptions of legitimacy. Besides, it allows to understand the conferment of legitimacy based on charismatic or traditional motives without getting rid of them as obsolete or unacceptable forms of legitimacy.

Believing in legitimacy : the centrality of values in a political realist approach / I. Cozzaglio. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Warwick Graduate Conference in Political and Legal Theory tenutosi a Coventry nel 2017.

Believing in legitimacy : the centrality of values in a political realist approach

I. Cozzaglio
2017

Abstract

Recent contributions in philosophy have shown that political realism, although refusing the elaboration of external moral standards on which to base legitimacy, does not renounce to a normative dimension. The version of political realism used in those reconstructions does not often stress the beliefs-based character of legitimacy, especially in the version elaborated by Max Weber. On the other hand, accounts of legitimacy based on beliefs do not explain what it means to have a belief in legitimacy. The aim of this paper is to show that a conception of legitimacy strictly dependent on individuals’ beliefs still presents a deep normative character, as the assessment of legitimacy depends on values embedded in individuals’ conceptions of life. To show this, I will need to provide an account of the characteristic beliefs and preferences (and their relation to truth) involved in the process of assessing legitimacy. In the first part I will provide an account of a realist approach to legitimacy based on people’s beliefs, showing some aspects shared by Max Weber and Bernard Williams. I will then show that neither Weber nor Williams explain what it means to have a belief in legitimacy. Particularly in Weber’s account, it seems that an individual conferring legitimacy on a non-rational basis stays silent in front of the question “why do you think the regime is legitimate?”. I will then suggest that having a belief in legitimacy means that the individual believes to have good reasons to support the regime legitimacy, even when the individual is eventually proved, by an external observer, to be wrong in her beliefs. In particular, to believe that a regime is legitimate means to believe that: 1. The regime has a value x; 2. Value x is positive/valuable per se; 3. Therefore, the regime is legitimate. The peculiarity of this view is that values are not necessarily intended in a moral way, but, neutrally, as something valuable; therefore, the challenge is to show that even the most instrumental account of legitimacy presents a value-dimension. Indeed, even a conception of legitimacy based on the mere provision of security (intended as the value x mentioned above) needs to refer to some principles and values in order to assess what security is: whether the prevention of people harming each other’s physical integrity, or the provision of a minimum quantity of goods to guarantee physical survival, or the protection of the individual intended as a person and not just as a body (including her ideas, desires, projects). To speak neutrally of positive qualities and to include all the types of values in the process of assessing legitimacy presents some advantages, as it allows to apply this concept of legitimacy to all the kinds of regimes – a concept that includes context-based conceptions of legitimacy. Besides, it allows to understand the conferment of legitimacy based on charismatic or traditional motives without getting rid of them as obsolete or unacceptable forms of legitimacy.
18-feb-2017
political legitimacy; political realism; belief; Weber; Williams; values
Settore SPS/01 - Filosofia Politica
Centre for Ethics, Law and Public Affairs
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/celpa/conf/
Believing in legitimacy : the centrality of values in a political realist approach / I. Cozzaglio. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Warwick Graduate Conference in Political and Legal Theory tenutosi a Coventry nel 2017.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/473350
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