Why values matter in the process of conferring legitimacy

Questions of legitimacy in political philosophy have been raised accordingly to two main strands. On the one hand, normative political theory has elaborated moral external standards on which the assessment of legitimacy must be rooted. On the other hand, political realism has refused to elaborate external moral standards, although without renouncing to normativity: a regime is legitimate if it «makes sense» (Williams 2005) to people living in that regime. In both the views, a critical role is played by people’s conceptions of life and the political community. However, while in case of normative political theory the importance of values is relatively more evident – as the legitimacy of the regime is based on the implementation of those values – the centrality of values within the realist tradition is not always taken for granted. The aim of this paper is to show why, even in a realist approach to political legitimacy, values play a critical role. In the first part of this paper I will provide an account of a realist approach to legitimacy based on people’s beliefs, showing some aspects shared by Max Weber and Bernard Williams. I will then show that neither Weber nor Williams explains what it means to have a belief in legitimacy. Then, I will proceed with an argument in favour of a values-centred account of legitimacy. First, the need to explain what does it mean to believe in legitimacy will show that even in a realist account (such as Weber’s one) it is necessary to resort to some principles and values. I will specify that values are not necessarily intended in a moral way, but, more basically, as something valuable. Second, I will show how different conceptions of legitimacy are elaborated from different values that are claimed to be at the basis of the political community nature and performance.