Experiences without Self-justification: the " Sticks and Stones " Argument in the Phaedo

My talk has one major and one secondary goals. The main purpose is to demonstrate that the “Sticks and Stones” Argument (SSA) in the Phaedo (74a9 ff.) proves, and not requires, the existence of the Forms. The topic is highly debated. Some scholars (among others: Penner, Dimas and recently Apolloni) think that SSA has the function to demonstrate that Forms exist; others (for instance: Jordan, Svavarsson), on the contrary, believe that SSA is intelligible if and only if it presupposes the Forms. In my opinion SSA is one of the arguments that Plato uses to prove the Forms, and it is an argument based on human experiences without self-justification. I mean cases in which we are incapable to legitimate our mental states on the plan of the mere empirical experience. An argument of this kind considers there are experiences that cannot be justified only in terms of the experience itself. In other terms, we have mental states (for instance, the concept of the Equal, i.e. something perfectly equal in all respects) that cannot be derived from our empirical experience of the world. But at the same time we are certain of that mental state; indeed we cannot confuse the Equality and the Inequality. As Penner highlights, we will never make a mistake about which one it is we are thinking about. How can we have such a certainty concerning our mental states? Or, more in general, how can we have certainty respect the mental states X and not-X, if we regularly confuse x and not-x things? At 72e3-73b2, an argument based on the recollection is proposed by Cebes. This argument is “one and the most beautiful” (ἑνὶ λόγῳ…καλλίστῳ). According to it, if men had not knowledge and right λόγος, they could not properly respond to those who ask about, for instance, geometric figures. To do this, the argument proceeds, the soul must be immortal, or rather must have some prenatal knowledge. Men are able to remember something when they are in contact with something else linked to the first. For example, when someone sees the lyre played by the beloved, he/she remembers the beloved; again, when someone sees a picture of the beloved, he/she remembers the beloved. And so on. In addition, he/she notes that there is always a gap between the original and the copy. Simmias agrees, but he says it is not necessary having an immortal soul to notice this gap. Indeed, we can certainly tell the difference between the portrait of Lorenzo de’ Medici by Bronzino and Lorenzo himself without having an immortal soul. If Socrates wants to be successful, he must be able to demonstrate that there are cases in which recognizing this gap is possible if and only if the soul is immortal. In other words, if and only if we have notions that we cannot justify in terms of experience alone. This is the function of SSA. The case of the Equal, in fact, is emblematic. In short, the argument runs as follows: 1. all “equal” things appear also unequal (to different people and/or in different circumstances); 2. so, we can confuse equal things and unequal things; 3. but we cannot confuse Equality and Inequality; 4. if equal things are always unequal in some respect but we know that Equality is not Inequality, it is necessary we possess the notion of the Equal independently from the perceptible experience; 5. there must therefore be something like the “Equal itself” and the soul must know it; 6. since we have begun to have experiences newborn, it follows that we assimilated the Equal before the birth; 7. thus, the soul existed before become incarnate. Contrary to what some people think, SSA proves at the same time both the Forms and the recollection. It does not require neither. I will argue that SSA is an Anti-nominalism argument. There are not only the “objects” we say “equal”, but also another “object”, the Equal itself, that the soul can know before birth. We can not abstract the notion of “Equal” from the things because none of them is really equal. But we are able to recognize the gap between the Equal, which is never unequal, and the things we call “equal”, which appear also unequal. The Equal is not the result of a processing of empirical data. It is important to remark also that 75c7-d5 extends this consideration to everything that is “in itself” (Beauty, Good, Just, Holy…). It is not therefore the Equal qua Equal the focus of the Phaedo’s passage, but the Equal qua an “itself” case. Plato wants to show, through the case of the Equal, that the Forms exist and the soul knows them somehow (i.e. in such a way sufficient to note the gap). The Equal is an emblematic case of recollection because it shows the inability of experience to justify itself in a more evident way than other cases. But this applies to the Beauty and other cases too. The secondary goal of my talk is to defend a non-problematic reading of the enormously controversial expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα at the lines 74c1-2: αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;. What is the meaning of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα? Is the question introduced by ἢ epexegetical or not? As to the first question, i.e. the meaning of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα, I believe that we should not assume that the expression alludes, for instance, to the base angles of an isosceles triangle (Burnet), or to the mathematical entities in general (Hackforth), or to a large class that includes Forms, mathematical entities, immanent properties and so on (Dimas), or that the plural is due to the fact that “Equal” is a relative notion (Geach), or again because according to Plato Forms like the Equal are of an internal relation between two or more symmetrically related items (Sedley). I think that the solution is much simpler. The expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα means “the Equal itself” or alludes to very generic “equals themselves” useful to the dialectical context, without any precise reference. There is no any grammatical reasons not to intend in this way. The neuter plural can be used to refer to singular entities. As the second point, i.e. the second question introduced by ἢ, I will argue it is epexegetical and it serves to highlight that this is the key of the whole argument.