TYPE AND EXPERIENCE. AN INQUIRY INTO THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF TYPE AND TYPIFYING-APPERCEPTION IN EXPERIENCE AND COGNITION

The work concentrates on the early works and production of Edmund Husserl, and especially, on the time we consider fundamental for the development of Husserl's later phenomenology. That will also cover a period normally less taken into consideration by the critic. Ideality is in our understanding linked as label-term to the Husserlian «eidetics», which is for its part explicitly derived in the first Book of Ideas from eidos, a term introduced in reality years earlier by Husserl, in connection with essence [Wesen]. It is in fact only around the time of the works belonging to this fundamental introduction to phenomenology that the concept of eidos is assumed as an equivalent for «pure essence» and phenomenology is established for its part as “eidetics” or “eidetic science”. Around the time of the Logical Investigations indeed, the term essence comprehends a large variety of concepts less distinguished in comparison with to later Husserlian works, for example, for what concern the concept of eidos. Among the different definitions and functions showed by essence and idea in the 1900 work and in the course on logic and epistemology before the Ideas, we will try to stress one peculiar aspect of such overly complex thematic, which is the partial definition of essence in terms of conceptual universality. With respect to this characterization, we will therefore try to indicate the kind of definition given to it by Husserl, which partially recalls the traditional interpretation of the Universal in the sense of an ideal terms, or a common element, over against the multiplicity. This latter is therefore interpreted in the sense of a universal object. Our aim will be consequently, to analyze a series of manuscripts on the period prior to the Logical Investigations, where, according to our interpretation, all the features assigned to the same concept are present. That will be basically, show the “origin” of one important aspect of the future doctrine of essence, even besides the later interpretation via Lotze and Bolzano of Ideality.