The paper contributes to the theory of proportional import restraints, that is restraints that are defined in terms of percentage market shares instead of in terms of volume of imports. It is shown that an increase in the market share of foreign firms from zero has a negative effect locally on domestic welfare. In the case of a domestic oligopoly, domestic firms may prefer a proportional restraint over an equivalent volume restraint
Market-share import restraints in oligopoly / V. Denicolò, P.G. Garella. - In: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0965-7576. - 7:4(1999), pp. 732-743. [10.1111/1467-9396.00196]
Market-share import restraints in oligopoly
P.G. GarellaUltimo
1999
Abstract
The paper contributes to the theory of proportional import restraints, that is restraints that are defined in terms of percentage market shares instead of in terms of volume of imports. It is shown that an increase in the market share of foreign firms from zero has a negative effect locally on domestic welfare. In the case of a domestic oligopoly, domestic firms may prefer a proportional restraint over an equivalent volume restraint
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