Mandato, mandat, agency: fiduciary duties and power of revocation

My speech covers a wide field of investigation, in which I have chosen a path that touches these topics through some key points of the European law history. After briefly outlining the “mandatum” contract in the ancient Rome and its’ backgrounds in the sentiment of amicitia (friendship), it will examined the Medieval merchant families practice of expanding their business throughout the relatives’ net, of building their business relationship on trust and fiduciary behaviors. Then, it will be found other fiduciary duties, developed by the English Chancery Court’s case law, in the eighteen and nineteen Century. Understanding the historical process will clarify the stratification of a legal attitude as per the relation between the principal and the agent. This legal mentality has become the foundation of the "commercial agency" discipline. With regard to the nowadays contract of mandate, it is known that its importance has grown enormously: from a “petit contrat”, of little use, to a “grand contrat” (to use a French metaphor), broadly spread out into the business world. It will be also seen that, in light of the “professionalization” of the contract of “mandate”, the different discipline of the contract of “commercial agency” has to be followed in order to understand the essential equilibrium between the principal’s power of revocation and the agent’s right to compensation in case of "revocation abusive" (to make use of a French terminology). Such agent’s entitlement to compensation would otherwise be difficultly comprehensible. Finally, it will be looked at the cases of "absolute" irrevocability, where the mandate, flexible tool for all “collaboration contracts”, will take a different appearance. The "mandate", born and developed in order to protect the interest of the principal or, even, the principal himself, will become an instrument of more complexed agreements, through related or linked contracts. The mandate, in the interest of the agent or third parties, such as creditors, contractual counterparties, "beneficiaries" in the broad sense, will be far from the traditional idea of “mandate” and, in that case, the discipline will consequently be quite different. In these cases the “causa” (to use a civil law terminology) of the contract will change and the idea of representation will lose its importance while the contract will tend to achieve different goals (such as security, debt, trust in a broader sense).