THE POLITICS OF MINIMUM INCOME PROTECTION EXPLAINING THE POLICY TRAJECTORIES OF REGIONAL MINIMUM INCOME SCHEMES IN ITALY AND SPAIN

When and why do politicians introduce minimum income reforms? Traditionally, this policy sector has been considered less invested by partisan politics dynamics, in reason of low political resources of would be beneficiaries and low weight on overall welfare budget. Conversely, this work argues that the non-contentiousness of this policy field is result of specific social and political actor preferences and strategies. The emergence of social groups opposing targeted benefits and/or the political activation of additional cleavages – and in particular the religious and the territorial ones – might make this policy field particularly contentious, and partisan dynamics more relevant. Empirically, this dissertation focuses on two countries known for long time for the weak development of social assistance within their social policy system, and the absence of a minimum income scheme: Italy and Spain. In both countries, at the subnational level have been recently introduced last resort safety nets, departing from their traditional model: why is it so? And why those programs rapidly diffused and gradually consolidated in Spain, while in Italy they constituted very often a very brief experience followed by policy reversal and the return to the traditional model? Through an in-depth reconstruction of the policy-making process in four regional cases – Castile and Léon and the Community of Madrid in Spain, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Lazio in Italy – this thesis argues that political exchange dynamics between powerful social groups, in particular trade unions and faith-based organizations, and political parties are crucial to have path departure, gradual institutionalization and/or policy reversal. More specifically it is argued that the strategic choices of social groups - the socio-political demand – and the key features of the party system – the supply – were conducive to different political exchange dynamics, which are ultimately responsible for the different policy trajectories of regional minimum income schemes in Italy and Spain. In Spain trade unions and faith-based organizations support for Mis (strong demand) under moderate pluralism led to gradual institutionalization, while in Italy, a weak demand coupled with the activation of the religious cleavage made this policy field contentious, with centre left coalitions introducing (often) those programs, and centre-right government displacing them.