FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS AND POLITICAL PRESCRIPTIONS

Abstract In my research I analysed the feasibility requirements of normative political theories. Here my attempt is to answer to the question: which facts affect the feasibility of normative political prescriptions? I structured the thesis in five chapters. In the first chapter, I will provide a normative argument in order to hold that normative political prescriptions should respect a feasibility requirement. I will maintain that normative political prescriptions can imply legal rules, and legal rules are coercible. I will assume that it would be morally unacceptable to sanction people who do not act in accordance with a (set of) prescription(s) if it was impossible for those people to act in accordance with that (set of) prescription(s). Consequently, I will conclude that normative political prescriptions should adhere to a certain specification of the maxim ‘ought implies can’ (‘OIC’). In particular, this means that normative political prescriptions does exist in a hypothetical set of ‘all normative political prescriptions’ only if people can satisfy it. I will argue that the term ‘can’ could assume two meanings: ‘can as being possible’ and ‘can as being able to’. I will conclude this chapter by claiming that: prescriptions are feasible or not whether or not it is possible for human beings to act in accordance with a prescribed (of forbidden) course of action; prescriptions are more or less feasible depending on how much that human beings are able to act in accordance with a prescribed (or forbidden) course of action. In the second chapter, I will mainly review the state of art concerning the analysis of feasibility and I will criticize it in some regards. Here, I will introduce terms and commons standpoints found in the literature about the feasibility of normative theories. Then, I will pay attention to the list of facts that are usually considered to be feasibility constraints. Feasibility constraints will be distinguished between hard feasibility constraints (logic rules, physical and biological laws) and soft feasibility constraints (mainly: state of technology, institutions, economy, culture, human beings’ features). I will show that the selection of soft constraints is a relevant problem for the analysis of feasibility. Hence, we should distinguish between simple facts and facts that are soft feasibility constraints. In order to draw this distinction, I will suggest that it is necessary to find out an adequate formal criterion for the selection of soft feasibility constraints. In the following two chapters, I will propose two different kinds of criteria for the selection of soft constraints, namely normative and practical criteria. These criteria propose different ways to distinguish facts affecting the feasibility of prescriptions from simple facts. In the third chapter, I will propose two normative criteria different kinds of criteria for the selection of soft constraints. The hypothesis behind normative criteria is that: ‘all and only normatively (or morally) valuable facts should be considered soft constraints’. I will criticize normative criteria for the selection of soft constraints for two reasons. First, these criteria are sensitive to controversial implications that do not fit with my definition of feasibility and with the common sense definition of ‘feasible as capable of being successfully used’. Second, I will argue that they lead to viciously circular arguments for the selection of soft feasibility constraints and that, for this reason, we should not accept them. Therefore, I will conclude that normative criteria are not adequate to select soft feasibility constraints In the fourth chapter, I will consider a practical criterion for the selection of soft constraints. This criterion selects soft constraints paying attention to the influence that certain facts have on the success of certain prescriptions. Although it needs some refinements, I will show that this criterion is consistent with the commonly accepted definition of feasibility and with my own definition of feasibility. Therefore, I will consider it adequate to select feasibility constraints. Thanks to this criterion, I will criticize one of the main tenets of the literature about feasibility. That is to say, I will conclude that institutional facts, cultural facts and economic facts should not be considered feasibility constraints since they are not independent from what people want. Hence, I will show that these social facts, which are usually and incontestably considered soft constraints, do not matter for the feasibility of normative political prescriptions. In the last chapter I will propose an answer to the research question. I will hold that facts constraining the feasibility of normative political prescriptions are: first (hard constraints), logic rules, physical laws, biological laws and any other fact undermining the feasibility of a prescription in any place of the world at any time; second (soft constraints), others’ motivations, lacking material resources and human needs.