This paper discusses Aristotle’s statement (Metaph. A 9.991a8-9) that both Anaxagoras and Eudoxus claimed that things are the result of a mixture of original elements, in relation to Plato’s metaphysics. Eudoxus used this immanentistic thesis to remodel one central component of Plato’s Theory of Form, that is the “participation”. The first part of the paper analyzes some Anaxagorean aspects in Plato’s metaphysics, showing that Plato shares with Anaxagoras the “Transmission Theory of Causality” (as called by Dancy), but he refuses its immanentistic version. The second part interprets Hipp. ma. 301b2- 301c2 as a refusal of a immanentistic interpretation of verbs like προσγίγνομαι and κοσμεῖται. It is also rejected Morgan’s thesis according to which Hippias supports an aware mereological metaphysical theory. The third part contests that Phaed. 100-106 is a defense of an immanentistic metaphysics abandoned by Plato in his later works. The meaning of the expression to; ejn hJmi'n does not include a mereological approach to the causality. In Plato’s metaphysics there is no strong contradiction between transcendence and immanence. The fourth part shows that the Parmenides refuses any immanentistic version of the relationship between Forms and things. Lastly, I will argue that from a Platonic point of view the only acceptable version is the separated interpretation of Transmission Theory of Causality.
|Titolo:||Partecipazione, mescolanza, separazione : Platone e l'immanentismo|
|Parole Chiave:||Plato; Anaxagoras; Eudoxus; immanentism; Forms|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore M-FIL/07 - Storia della Filosofia Antica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|