Thaler and Sunstein justify nudge policies from welfaristic premises: nudges are acceptable because they benefit the individuals who are nudged. A tacit assumption behind this strategy is that we can identify the true preferences of decision-makers. We argue that this assumption is often unwarranted, and that as a consequence nudge policies must be justified in a different way. A possible strategy is to abandon welfarism and endorse genuine paternalism. Another one is to argue that the biases of decision that choice architects attempt to eliminate create externalities. For example, in the case of intertemporal discounting, the costs of preference reversals are not always paid by the discounters, because they are transferred onto other individuals. But if this is the case, then nudges are best justified from a political rather than welfaristic standpoint.
A Political Justification of Nudging / F. Guala, L. Mittone. - In: REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. - ISSN 1878-5158. - 6:3(2015), pp. 385-395.
|Titolo:||A Political Justification of Nudging|
GUALA, FRANCESCO (Primo)
|Parole Chiave:||Philosophy; Experimental and Cognitive Psychology|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0241-8|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|