This article develops a formal model on the politics of delegation in the European Union incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role of the Commission, the legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations, and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to and increases the discretion of the Commission. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision making, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda setting power.

A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union / F. FRANCHINO. - In: JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS. - ISSN 0951-6298. - 17:2(2005), pp. 217-247. [10.1177/0951629805050861]

A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union

F. Franchino
Primo
2005

Abstract

This article develops a formal model on the politics of delegation in the European Union incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role of the Commission, the legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations, and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to and increases the discretion of the Commission. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision making, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda setting power.
Commitment; Delegation; European Union; Legislative procedures
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/33889
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