This article critically elaborates Majone’s argument that there are two logics underlying the delegation of powers to the European Commission: the logic of efficiency and the logic of credibility. It analyses 601 provisions of secondary legislation and suggests a method to distinguish the two rationales. It then correlates executive powers with statutory constraints. A surprising result is that these constraints are more associated, in general, with credibility-based than with efficiency-based delegation, however statutory constraints that facilitate control by national state actors are more likely to be associated with efficiency-based delegation. The article concludes emphasising that different strategies of control are related to different underlying motivations to delegate.

Efficiency or Credibility? Testing the Two Logics of Delegation to the European Commission / F. Franchino. - In: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. - ISSN 1350-1763. - 9:5(2002), pp. 1-18.

Efficiency or Credibility? Testing the Two Logics of Delegation to the European Commission

F. Franchino
Primo
2002

Abstract

This article critically elaborates Majone’s argument that there are two logics underlying the delegation of powers to the European Commission: the logic of efficiency and the logic of credibility. It analyses 601 provisions of secondary legislation and suggests a method to distinguish the two rationales. It then correlates executive powers with statutory constraints. A surprising result is that these constraints are more associated, in general, with credibility-based than with efficiency-based delegation, however statutory constraints that facilitate control by national state actors are more likely to be associated with efficiency-based delegation. The article concludes emphasising that different strategies of control are related to different underlying motivations to delegate.
Bureaucratic autonomy ; credibility ; delegation ; efficiency ; European Commission ; statutory constraints
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/33885
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