This article critically elaborates Majone’s argument that there are two logics underlying the delegation of powers to the European Commission: the logic of efficiency and the logic of credibility. It analyses 601 provisions of secondary legislation and suggests a method to distinguish the two rationales. It then correlates executive powers with statutory constraints. A surprising result is that these constraints are more associated, in general, with credibility-based than with efficiency-based delegation, however statutory constraints that facilitate control by national state actors are more likely to be associated with efficiency-based delegation. The article concludes emphasising that different strategies of control are related to different underlying motivations to delegate.
|Titolo:||Efficiency or Credibility? Testing the Two Logics of Delegation to the European Commission|
FRANCHINO, FABIO (Primo)
|Parole Chiave:||Bureaucratic autonomy ; credibility ; delegation ; efficiency ; European Commission ; statutory constraints|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2002|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1080/13501760110104145|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|