When it adopts an EC law, the Council of Ministers, the main legislative body of the Community, decides on the extent to which implementing measures are taken by national administrations and the latitude of national executive action. This article reviews, across a data set of 158 major EC laws, the pattern of delegation of executive powers to national authorities and the statutory constraints employed by the Council to delimit the national execution of European policies. The study provides, first, a comparative assessment of the choices taken by Community legislators on issues of delegation and suggests an explanation to the relative stringency of European law. It then evaluates the long-term trend toward more concise legislation and greater executive discretion of Member States, but not necessarily of more legislative output, that emerges from the analysis of the data set. Finally, it explains how factors such as credibility of commitment, information asymmetries and the need for flexible, but controlled and credible, transition to European policies account for the use of twelve categories of constraints that the Council imposes on national administrations.

Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis / F. FRANCHINO. - In: WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS. - ISSN 0140-2382. - 24:4(2001), pp. 169-192.

Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis

F. FRANCHINO
Primo
2001

Abstract

When it adopts an EC law, the Council of Ministers, the main legislative body of the Community, decides on the extent to which implementing measures are taken by national administrations and the latitude of national executive action. This article reviews, across a data set of 158 major EC laws, the pattern of delegation of executive powers to national authorities and the statutory constraints employed by the Council to delimit the national execution of European policies. The study provides, first, a comparative assessment of the choices taken by Community legislators on issues of delegation and suggests an explanation to the relative stringency of European law. It then evaluates the long-term trend toward more concise legislation and greater executive discretion of Member States, but not necessarily of more legislative output, that emerges from the analysis of the data set. Finally, it explains how factors such as credibility of commitment, information asymmetries and the need for flexible, but controlled and credible, transition to European policies account for the use of twelve categories of constraints that the Council imposes on national administrations.
EU policies; Contraints; National Administrations
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/33884
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