De Finetti’s conception of events is one of the most distinc- tive aspects of his theory of probability, yet it appears to be somewhat elusive. The purpose of this note is to set up a formal framework in which a rigorous characterisation of this notion, and its cognate mod- elling assumptions, gives rise to a detailed formalisation of the betting problem which underlies the celebrated Dutch Book Argument. As our main result shows, this refinement captures an intuitive condition which de Finetti imposed on the betting problem, namely that it is irrational to bet on an event which may be true, but whose truth will never be ascertained by the players.
The epistemic structure of de Finetti's betting problem / T. Flaminio, H. Hosni - In: Proceedings of the 9th Italian Convention on Computational Logic / [a cura di] F. Lisi. - [s.l] : CEUR Workshop Proceedings Series., 2012. (( Intervento presentato al 9. convegno Proceedings of the 9th Italian Convention on Computational Logic tenutosi a Roma nel 2012.
The epistemic structure of de Finetti's betting problem
H. Hosni
2012
Abstract
De Finetti’s conception of events is one of the most distinc- tive aspects of his theory of probability, yet it appears to be somewhat elusive. The purpose of this note is to set up a formal framework in which a rigorous characterisation of this notion, and its cognate mod- elling assumptions, gives rise to a detailed formalisation of the betting problem which underlies the celebrated Dutch Book Argument. As our main result shows, this refinement captures an intuitive condition which de Finetti imposed on the betting problem, namely that it is irrational to bet on an event which may be true, but whose truth will never be ascertained by the players.
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