We commonly recognize vague predicates when we do not find boundaries to their extension. Would an omniscient being find it equally impossible to establish such boundaries? I will argue that if a semantic theory of vagueness like supervaluationism is correct, we cannot answer the question. The reason is that, under this assumption, cooperative behaviour is not possible for an omniscient being.
Vagueness and omniscience / E. Paganini (PHILOSOPHISCHE ANALYSE). - In: God, truth, and other enigmas / [a cura di] M. Szatkowski. - Boston : de Gruyter, 2015 Jul. - ISBN 9783110419955. - pp. 89-96 (( convegno God, truth, and other enigmas tenutosi a Warsaw nel 2013.
Vagueness and omniscience
E. PaganiniPrimo
2015
Abstract
We commonly recognize vague predicates when we do not find boundaries to their extension. Would an omniscient being find it equally impossible to establish such boundaries? I will argue that if a semantic theory of vagueness like supervaluationism is correct, we cannot answer the question. The reason is that, under this assumption, cooperative behaviour is not possible for an omniscient being.
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