Animals as property and their legal protection ‘mankind-interest/shaped’

As far as the legal system is concerned, animals and humans occupy completely different positions. Despite the fact that they are sentient beings, animals are afforded a status similar to that of inanimate objects and are included within the definition of goods for the purpose of the law. For this reason they can be made the subject of absolute property. This legal position permeates world jurisdictions, being visible in even the most progressive world legal systems. The categorization of animals as property impacts their legal protection, making animals protected by virtue of their status as property rather than via the ascription of legal rights. In consequence, the interests of animals are conveniently side-lined, while a coherent moral view requires that we draw the line at sentience, considering also ethical and moral dimensions of our impact on animals’ life. The law does, however, provide some protections. But, due to the underlying status of animals as property, the legislative provisions continue to present concerning loopholes that undermine animal protection. Animals’ status as property places them in a position of weakness against human interests and makes legal certain human practices towards non-humans—practices that cause pain, discomfort, suffering and death (i.e. suffering incurred by animals during “accepted husbandry practices”, which are commonly recognised and not prohibited by legislation, or the destruction of an animal in ‘an appropriate and humane manner’). Legal standards remain bound by human (and economic) concerns and the welfare provisions currently in place fail to address the main sources of animal suffering, often serving to entrench established practices, limited as they are by property status (and as such, by economic imperatives). The interpretation of this concept remains relevant and places emphasis on the evidence that the property status severely limits the ascription of sufficient protection and bolsters welfare provisions ‘mankind-interest shaped’, which too often fail to recognize that animals have any non-tradable interests. A reflection about the (im)possibility to balance the interests of humans as property owners against the interests of animals that exist as property is proposed, highlighting, in particular, that it is evident where animals are considered a means to human ends. In this last regard, the case of pets will be examined as a special challenge to normativity: are they a part of the family, with a specially recognizable subjective life (objects ‘of caregiving’), or simply objects to be used at the whim of their owners? The aim is to analyse if recurring issues that stem from property status, which impact on effective legislative animal protection across the jurisdictions, can be linked with a ‘logic of domination’ that perhaps doesn’t involve all the animals in the same way, but surely disrespects the humanity itself when underestimates its ‘living’ properties. It will be argued that gradual improvements are possible through reforms in the current welfare system to foster an incremental shift toward the recognition of animal rights and may serve instead to entrench the property status of animals.