The article goes through the critical analysis of the rawlsian concept of origi- nal position, expressed by Habermas in 1995. Habermasian remarks on the original posi- tion aims to undermine the justifiability of such a concept as fundamental to the whole political theory. In fact, it is supposed to substitute the procedures of democratic de- liberation with a well thought-out construction belonging uniquely to the theoretician. According to Habermas, substantive outcomes of procedures must be left out from po- litical theory, whose task is to set a standard for the best possible procedures, meaning a democratic framework in which all opinions and beliefs take part to the decision. Rawls approves the critique since from his point of view, no procedure is able to avoid the in- clusion of some substantive contents. On such assumption he twists to habermasian the- ory the same remarks, observing that it avoids substantive assumptions at political level, embodying them at the epistemic one. As a result, the article raises some issues about the desirability and feasibility of both theories, even considering which interpretation of the role of political philosophy they imply.
|Titolo:||Le implicazione metaforiche del confronto tra Habermas e Rawls del 1995 sul concetto di posizione originaria|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SPS/01 - Filosofia Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2012|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|