The Contrast between Pristina and Belgrad in Northern Kosovo, a Region of a Non-sovereign State

In February 2008, the Albanian Kosovar ruling class proclaimed Kosovo’s independence, which by the end of 2013 had been recognized by 106 countries in the world. The author is convinced that Kosovo does not fulfil any of the international requirements for legitimacy necessary for the region to obtain full sovereignty. In fact, Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council is still valid, and does not give Kosovo independence, but only administrative autonomy. Furthermore, Kosovo does not have some of the fundamental characteristics of a sovereign state, such as real control over its territory and international recognition of the state’s power; in this case, the latter is insufficient even within the EU since five of its 27 members do not consider Kosovo a sovereign state, but only a Serbian province. When it comes to first of the abovementioned characteristics, the dispute over control of the borders between northern Kosovo and Serbia, which went on in July and August 2011, showed Priština’s government inability to control not only its border passages, but also the region situated north from the Ibar River, whose mainly Serbian population refuses Kosovo’s institutions and accepts only Serbian citizenship for itself. The international missions in Kosovo, legitimized by the UN, NATO and the EU, which work independently from one another and are perceived differently by the ethnically divided population – are not able to implement shared institutions or to limit the power of criminal organizations that control the territory. The only role they are able to play is in preventing the escalation of ethnic tensions and their transformation into open violence, which means avoiding the danger of a civil war in the very heart of Europe. The problematic relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, which is quite obvious at their borders, could diminish significantly if the EU should, in the foreseeable future, accept as members all the Balkan countries that currently form a sort of a “black hole”, an area of instability and disorder to be kept outside the “important” part of Europe, yet still a potential source of danger to the whole continent. The accession of the western Balkans into the EU would not imply an admission of their ethnic and economic problems; on the contrary, the ruling classes that fuel ethno-national contrasts (which now are potentially dangerous) would appear newly legitimized by all the benefits that the population would get, and therefore the destructive currents would be transformed into heritage to be preserved. The facts prove this theory right: within the EU, the ethnic conflicts inside member states (especially the United Kingdom, Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus) lost their destructive potential not before, but after their admission into this supranational community. In fact, it has the intrinsic characteristic of putting into perspective the value of a traditional nation-state, a notion that is very anachronistic in the current global competition, favouring a larger aggregation that, however, recognizes local identities. On the other hand, it would not be realistic to expect Belgrade and Priština to reach an agreement without their admission into the EU, which could render their dispute over northern Kosovo senseless: in fact, Serbia’s request of exclusive sovereignty over the region north of the Ibar River is incompatible with the Albanian Kosovars’ wish to have complete control over Kosovo’s entire territory, given the extreme reluctance of the non-Albanian population to allow a Kosovar national identity for themselves.