Not Kant vs. Scheler, but either Kant or Scheler : from construction to foundation of ethics

Scheler’s moral theory is often presented as a critical reaction to Kantian formalism. The majority of contributions on this topic deals with Scheler’s proposal of an a priori material ethics in contrast with the a priori formal ethics developed by Kant, or with the critical analysis of the eight prejudices ascribed by Scheler to Kant. A very few of them, however, explore their respective foundational attempts to see why such a conflict actually arises. This paper addresses exactly the foundational issue, trying to fulfill this empty space in the literature. In particular, by briefly investigating the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral and the doctrine of the Fact of Reason depicted by Kant in the second Critique on the one hand and the phenomenological theory of values elaborated by Scheler on the other hand, it will be shown that the disagreement between the two authors should not be ascribed to a real incompatibility, but rather to a different way of conceiving what the foundation of ethics actually is