This essay challenges the idea according to which, in legal interpretation, a well-defined literal meaning is always (or in the most of cases) detectable. I will claim that this idea is untenable and, at any rate, when lawyers talk of literal meaning, they rarely refer to a totally a-contextual meaning; rather they refer to a meaning which is determined by contextual elements too, and is assumed to be unique and well determined precisely because of the determinacy and uniqueness of these elements. I will argue that even this idea is misleading and try to support an alternative view of meaning.

The Myth of Literal Meaning in Legal Interpretation / F. Poggi. - In: ANALISI E DIRITTO. - ISSN 1126-5779. - (2013), pp. 313-335.

The Myth of Literal Meaning in Legal Interpretation

F. Poggi
2013

Abstract

This essay challenges the idea according to which, in legal interpretation, a well-defined literal meaning is always (or in the most of cases) detectable. I will claim that this idea is untenable and, at any rate, when lawyers talk of literal meaning, they rarely refer to a totally a-contextual meaning; rather they refer to a meaning which is determined by contextual elements too, and is assumed to be unique and well determined precisely because of the determinacy and uniqueness of these elements. I will argue that even this idea is misleading and try to support an alternative view of meaning.
interpretation ; semantics ; pragmatics ; contextualism ; literalism
Settore IUS/20 - Filosofia del Diritto
2013
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/231084
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