Far from having simply blurred logic and ontology in his interpretation of inherence in the Discourse metaphysics, Leibniz never ended up inquiring about this fundamental relation. Thus, he tried to work out a unified theory of inesse, being able to give an account of its different interpretations: the logical, phenomenological, mathematical or properly ontological ones. This theory turns out to be a sort of general mereology, also bound to a theory of conditions. It contemplates the possibility of several applications, going from the foundation of geometry concepts to the monadological explanation of bodies. Within its context Leibniz tries to provide a final clarification of the ontological background of predication.

Leibniz et l'inhérence : diu multumque investigavi generalem notionem tuo inesse / S. Di Bella. - In: ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE. - ISSN 0003-9632. - 77:1(2014), pp. 17-42.

Leibniz et l'inhérence : diu multumque investigavi generalem notionem tuo inesse

S. Di Bella
2014

Abstract

Far from having simply blurred logic and ontology in his interpretation of inherence in the Discourse metaphysics, Leibniz never ended up inquiring about this fundamental relation. Thus, he tried to work out a unified theory of inesse, being able to give an account of its different interpretations: the logical, phenomenological, mathematical or properly ontological ones. This theory turns out to be a sort of general mereology, also bound to a theory of conditions. It contemplates the possibility of several applications, going from the foundation of geometry concepts to the monadological explanation of bodies. Within its context Leibniz tries to provide a final clarification of the ontological background of predication.
No
French
Leibniz; inherence; mereology
Settore M-FIL/06 - Storia della Filosofia
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Pubblicazione scientifica
2014
Centre Sèvres
77
1
17
42
26
Pubblicato
Periodico con rilevanza internazionale
NON aderisco
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Leibniz et l'inhérence : diu multumque investigavi generalem notionem tuo inesse / S. Di Bella. - In: ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE. - ISSN 0003-9632. - 77:1(2014), pp. 17-42.
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Prodotti della ricerca::01 - Articolo su periodico
1
262
Article (author)
no
S. Di Bella
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/231045
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