A rational agent revises its goals if something changes in its mental state. In this paper, we propose (i) a general framework based on classical propositional logic, to represent changes in the mental state of the agent after the acquisition of new information and/or after the arising of new desires; (ii) fundamental postulates that the function which generates the goal set must obey; and (iii) properties that this function must have to guarantee both the agent's maximal satisfaction and the consistency of the goal set.
Towards a framework for goal revision / C.C. Pereira, A.G.B. Tettamanzi - In: Proceedings of the 18. Belgium-Netherlands conference on artificial intelligence (BNAIC), 5-6 Oct 2006, Namur, Belgium. / [a cura di] Pierre-Yves Schobbens, Wim Vanhoof, Gabriel Schwanen. - Namur : University of Namur, 2006. - pp. 99-106 (( Intervento presentato al 18. convegno Belgium-Netherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence (BNAIC) tenutosi a Namur nel 2006.
Towards a framework for goal revision
C.C. Pereira;A.G.B. Tettamanzi
2006
Abstract
A rational agent revises its goals if something changes in its mental state. In this paper, we propose (i) a general framework based on classical propositional logic, to represent changes in the mental state of the agent after the acquisition of new information and/or after the arising of new desires; (ii) fundamental postulates that the function which generates the goal set must obey; and (iii) properties that this function must have to guarantee both the agent's maximal satisfaction and the consistency of the goal set.
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