This paper investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. We use two measures of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the level of support for agriculture is the higher, the higher is the level of political competition.
|Titolo:||Political competition and policy choices : the evidence from agricultural protection|
OLPER, ALESSANDRO (Ultimo)
|Parole Chiave:||Agricultural distortions; Constitutional rules; D72; D78; F13; O13; P16; Political competition|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore AGR/01 - Economia ed Estimo Rurale|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2014|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1111/agec.12018|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|