In this article, we describe the effects of strong nonpartisan legislative offices on the procedures and outcomes of the parliaments they serve. We consider four disciplinary approaches used to provide legislatures with information and analysis independent from the executive: the law, the budget, the management and the policy perspectives. We highlight how these competencies and their advice intervene in the pre-legislative scrutiny and in the post-legislative oversight. Our comparative analysis includes United States, United Kingdom, and Italy. The results confirm the substantial indifference to the policy analysis and program evaluation by the Italian parliament.
Parlamenti analitici / G. Regonini. - In: RIVISTA ITALIANA DI POLITICHE PUBBLICHE. - ISSN 1722-1137. - 1(2012 Apr), pp. 2.33-2.87. [10.1483/36734]
Parlamenti analitici
G. RegoniniPrimo
2012
Abstract
In this article, we describe the effects of strong nonpartisan legislative offices on the procedures and outcomes of the parliaments they serve. We consider four disciplinary approaches used to provide legislatures with information and analysis independent from the executive: the law, the budget, the management and the policy perspectives. We highlight how these competencies and their advice intervene in the pre-legislative scrutiny and in the post-legislative oversight. Our comparative analysis includes United States, United Kingdom, and Italy. The results confirm the substantial indifference to the policy analysis and program evaluation by the Italian parliament.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Parlamenti analitici.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Post-print, accepted manuscript ecc. (versione accettata dall'editore)
Dimensione
281.22 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
281.22 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.