Analitico, sintetico e a priori: questioni di forma. Il dibattito tra fenomenologia husserliana e empirismo logico

This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic/synthetic distinction between phenomenology and logical empiricism, which took place in the early part of the twentieth century. On the one side, the author reconstructs the debate itself from an historical angle; on the other, he gives a theoretical account of the different positions and arguments. In particular, he has three main aims: a) to clarify how, according to Husserl, the analyticsynthetic opposition is to be understood as the form/matter opposition; b) to show how this position has been misunderstood by neo-empiricist philosophers, in particular by Schlick in his paper against the theory of the factual a priori; c) to point out that Husserlian theory anticipates some relevant features in the matter of analyticity (i.e. the distinction between logical analytic and extra-logical analytic truths) which will be made fully explicit only by Carnap and Quine, philosophers of the following generation.