According to Searle (1969) a constitutive rule creates the very possibility of the entity it rules. Later on, other scholars - such as Benoist (2003), Conte (1983), Guastini (1983) - pointed out the inviolability of constitutive rules. In this paper we want to challenge the inviolability dogma by asking the following question: is it possible to have violations of constitutive rules? We will argue that a parametrical approach to constitutive rules can do away with the inviolability dogma. As a result, our approach allows for violations and introduces two different ways of exiting a game (semantic exit vs. practical exit).
Challenging the Constitutive Rules Inviolability Dogma / G. Feis, U. Sconfienza. - In: PHENOMENOLOGY AND MIND. - ISSN 2280-7853. - 3:(2012), pp. 127-138.
Challenging the Constitutive Rules Inviolability Dogma
G. FeisPrimo
;
2012
Abstract
According to Searle (1969) a constitutive rule creates the very possibility of the entity it rules. Later on, other scholars - such as Benoist (2003), Conte (1983), Guastini (1983) - pointed out the inviolability of constitutive rules. In this paper we want to challenge the inviolability dogma by asking the following question: is it possible to have violations of constitutive rules? We will argue that a parametrical approach to constitutive rules can do away with the inviolability dogma. As a result, our approach allows for violations and introduces two different ways of exiting a game (semantic exit vs. practical exit).File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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