Cats! Michotte's new enigma of perception

Most of the objects around us are partially hidden from our view by other objects. If they are three-dimensional objects, their backs, too, are hidden by their front side. Even if they are so obscured, we do not see just surfaces or parts of surfaces, but rather complete objects partially hidden from view by other objects or some of their own parts. Consider the following familiar example. You stand before a woman seated at her writing desk, and her visible parts, from a certain viewpoint, are her head, arms, and torso. There is ample light, you have good eyesight, and you are neither drunk nor under the influence of drugs. There is nothing within you or outside of you interfering with the information that the light transmits. If I ask you what you see, you will likely answer that you see a person sitting at her writing desk. This is also what I would say about you: I would say that you see a person sitting at her writing desk. What we both say is true: there is a person at her writing desk, and you see her. But naturally you do not see all parts of this woman; rather you see only some parts, namely those that are visible. Thus, a first question arises: Q1) Under what conditions can we claim to see an object, when that object is not entirely in view? (Q1) is about the conditions under which the assertion “S sees D” is true. We usually raise such a question if we have epistemological worries, that is, when we want to distinguish between veridical and falsidical experiences, or when we consider seeing veridical and want to know when seeing occurs. However, one might have phenomenological worries as well, that is, one might be interested in identifying the contents of these experiences. For example, does your experience of the woman amount to the experience of the visible parts of the woman only, or does it involve also some kind of experience of her non-visible parts as well? More generally: Q2) How can we qualify the experience we have when it seems to us that we see an object that is not entirely in view? Finally, there is a third sense in which perception of occlusion is enigmatic. Indeed one can ask: (Q3) What is the mechanism underlying this type of experience? (Q3) concerns the psychological mechanism underlying the experience described. My main task in this paper is to provide an answer to (Q1), which will in turn bring me to take a position on (Q2).