TESTING NEOREALIST THEORIES IN CASE OF GERMANY¿S EEC ENLARGEMENT POLICY, 1961-1979

Neorealism as a theory of international relations is criticized for its failure to predict a state foreign policy behavior. We argue, by contrast, that neorealism can be used as a theory of foreign policy at the structural level of analysis. Particularly, this study evaluates two neorealist theories – defensive realism and offensive realism, against historical records using a congruence analysis approach. To uncover the neorealist theories' explanatory power, ex ante predictions are generated regarding the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the European Economic Community's (EEC) Northern enlargement and the Mediterranean enlargements in the 1960's and the 1970's. The defensive realism's and offensive realism's predictions then are tested against the empirical evidence. The newly declassified archival documents have shown that neorealist theories capture much of the variation in Germany's EEC enlargement policy. It demonstrated that variation in the German foreign policy took place after a clearly defined shift in distribution of power, and consequently, in a realm of security had occurred. The research thus doubts negative criticism about neorealism as a tool for understanding state foreign behavior by initiating inquiry into the direct interaction between the distribution of power in the international system and state's security needs. It also advances the literature on neorealist theories by shifting their application away from war to cooperation. Furthermore, after this study it is now possible to conclude on which of the neorealist theories has the most potential regarding application to foreign policy analysis. From the test results we recommend defensive realism as a theory which has grater potential of explanatory power.