Among delegation theorists, accountability has recently turned into a key issue, as its devices and designs are believed to prevent the key problem of agents’ opportunism and permeability to special interests. But the concept is blurred, and there is little consensus about which institutional solutions should be preferred: with dominant rather than multiple accountees; with political principals as accountees only; against procedures rather than targets. The article aims at providing an answer. After clarifying the concept, a model is defined that links key accountability characteristics to system effectiveness, and run on a selected population of Western countries using the OECD budget governance data and the Qualitative Comparative Analisys technique.
|Titolo:||L'altro lato della delega|
DAMONTE, ALESSIA (Primo)
|Parole Chiave:||Accountability devices; Democratic deficit; Budget; Qualitative Comparative Analysis|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||dic-2010|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|