Among delegation theorists, accountability has recently turned into a key issue, as its devices and designs are believed to prevent the key problem of agents’ opportunism and permeability to special interests. But the concept is blurred, and there is little consensus on which institutional solutions should be preferred: with dominant rather than multiple accountees; with political principals as accountees only; against procedures or against targets. After clarifying the concept, the article defines a model that links key accountability characteristics to system effectiveness, operationalizes it using the OECD budget governance data from a selection of Western countries, and analyzes it with the Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
|Titolo:||L'altro lato della delega|
DAMONTE, ALESSIA (Primo)
|Parole Chiave:||Accountability devices; Democratic deficit; Budget; Qualitative Comparative Analysis|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||dic-2010|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1483/33684|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|